How and why do the principles of neutrality in international law serve an authoritarian country Turkmenistan?
Assuming an autocrat is committed to regime survival at the expense of other competing governing priorities, why would a regime engage with international legal norms and standards at all? If autocrats’ economic power is rising, and the democratic-autocratic balance is shifting in their favor, what is the benefit in “repurposing” legal institutions?
For thirty years, Turkmenistan’s foreign and domestic policy has been heavily influenced by its permanent neutrality, as enshrined in the Constitution, a national monument, and Neutrality Day. Since Turkmenistan gained its independence, it has adopted a policy of strict isolationism. The authoritarian regime has maintained tight control over its state-controlled economy and its civil society. The regime connects permanent neutrality with Turkmen national identity and values.
The Comment Under the Golden Arch: Permanent Neutrality and Authoritarian International Law in Turkmenistan by Madison Wall published in the Emory International Law Review discusses authoritarian international law (AIL) in the context of Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality, arguing that autocrats use legal status to further their repressive goals. The paper analyzes Turkmenistan’s legal identity and economic interests, Ginsburg’s theory of AIL, and the decline of permanent neutrality and its future uses, including policy implications.
The author takes the position that Tom Ginsburg’s theory of AIL includes autocrat’s use of a legal status to further their repressive goals. Taken further, an autocrat’s strategic adoption of permanent neutrality as a legal status is an expression of AIL, as observed in Turkmenistan.
The following are the highlights from the Comment.
Authoritarian International Law
Ginsburg’s conception of AIL is “legal rhetoric, practices and rules specifically designed to extend the survival and reach of authoritarian rule across space and or time”. He defines democracies as “states that hold elections, protect a small set of core rights related to political contestation, and uphold the rule of law and electoral contestation”. In opposition to the latter definition, Ginsburg narrowly defines authoritarian states as states that suppress elections, core rights, and the rule of law. According to Ginsburg, these state actions drive autocrats to understand, use, and participate in international law differently than democratic states.
Ginsburg’s empirical study shows that authoritarian states participate in far fewer international institutions, treaties, and formal dispute resolution mechanisms than their democratic counterparts, and we should expect to observe “a change in the normative character” of the ordering of international law. Since AIL places regime survival and sovereign priorities above liberal priorities.
The common motivations and strategies that authoritarians share have led to three emerging trends in international law. First, modern autocrats (heavily dependent on international trade, labor, and investment) have “integrated into the global capitalist economy”. Second, modern autocrats are less reliant on ideology, placing political survival above consistent messaging. Third, modern autocrats “abuse democratic forms for anti-democratic purposes”.
Abuse of democratic processes
There are many ways in which autocrats abuse democratic processes, bodies, laws – or any other democratic form – for anti-democratic purposes. For example, autocrats engage in this subversion by designing constitutions with long lists of rights “to provide for formal institutions that do not operate as a real arena of power” rather than protecting citizens or limiting sovereign power.
Autocrats create courts and hold elections, but these institutions do not serve the same functions as parallel institutions in democracies do (e.g., when the purpose of holding elections is to extend the lives of authoritarian leaders and collect data rather than provide citizens an opportunity to elect different leadership).
Autocratic regimes have used these imitative institutions and international law to bolster regime survival at home.
Assuming an autocrat is committed to regime survival at the expense of other competing governing priorities, why would a regime engage with international legal norms and standards at all? If autocrats’ economic power is rising, and the democratic-autocratic balance is shifting in their favor, what is the benefit in “repurposing” legal institutions?
Going beyond well-trod explanations of regime survival, Ginsburg theorizes that autocrats seek to 1) “actively reshape international legal standards in ways that advance their interests” and 2) use international law to further their authoritarian projects “extending new authoritarian legal norms that exist alongside and compete with democratic principles”.
In short, autocrats may benefit from this reshaping by gaining legitimacy, coordinating with an autocratic bloc, and increasing their ability to repress.
Internal uses of permanent neutrality
Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality helped political elites and regime leadership more effectively oppress civilians at home. Permanent neutrality freed up the Turkmen armed forces, allowing them to focus on internal threats and regime survival rather than external military conflicts. The regime used the military internally to support its frequent rounds of “purging” bureaucrats from positions. The personality cult cultivated by the regime upholds its leaders as the protector of the country, tying the status of permanent neutrality to the political legitimacy of the executive.
The ruling elites are incentivized to maintain the status quo (maintaining neutrality) because the current regime facilitates high levels of corruption and repression that benefit them. Finally, due to its permanent neutrality and isolationism, Turkmenistan cannot be threatened with soft power as readily; the regime is not as susceptible to the influence of major powers such as Russia, China, and the United States. Turkmenistan’s isolation gives the regime latitude (and justification for) minimizing its involvement in world affairs.
External uses of Permanent Neutrality
As a permanently neutral state, the Turkmen regime prefers to enter bilateral relations over multiple multilateral agreements. As a rule, Turkmenistan does not weigh in on conflicts between great powers. In 2014, Turkmenistan chose not to vote on a U.N. General Assembly resolution on behalf of U.N. member states calling the international community to respect the “territorial integrity of Ukraine”. This is typical for the regime; refraining from voting on a resolution is distinct from endorsing, abstaining on, or rejecting a resolution.
The regime’s international reputation when it comes to neutrality is well-earned. Votes like this present an opportunity for the regime to bolster its reputation as a neutral U.N. member state by demonstrating its commitment to principles of neutrality. Turkmenistan looks for low-cost opportunities to signal its commitment to related principles such as sovereignty and impartiality in the resolution of conflicts.
Building and defending this reputation is important for a dictatorship in a post-9/11 and Syrian civil war era. The regime does not want to be labeled as a rogue state and make itself more vulnerable to foreign invasion, like its neighbor Afghanistan in 2003. Strict adherence to the principles of neutrality might provide some protection from a coalition of more powerful states.
Turkmenistan is cognizant of its image as a dictatorship because the regime has selectively projected that image to the world. Ashgabat is aware of the danger and has no desire to be viewed by the world like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein because the regime has selectively projected that image to the world.
Policy Implications
Permanent neutrality may have several drawbacks in Turkmenistan. The regime’s isolation, dictatorial image, and lack of ties with the international community present major drawbacks. The country’s isolationist posture means that the regime has not spent resources developing important relationships for the country’s survival. The regime does not have allies to call on and it has missed opportunities to become stronger through international relationships
Permanent neutrality is entrenched in Turkmenistan. This is a powerful fact; both history and regime behavior suggest that the country will maintain its unique status. The flexibility of the permanent neutrality appears to give the regime external and domestic political coverage, reinforce the regime’s mythology of Turkmen nationality and cult of personality, and stagnate the regime to ruling elites’ benefit. Historically, Turkmenistan has reaped these benefits without suffering consequences in the form of consequential oversight from the international community.
In conclusion, the regime’s permanent neutrality is likely to continue because it benefits the country’s ruling elites, bolsters regime survival, and has no clear penalty.
