Propaganda plays a pivotal role in consolidating power and maintaining the state’s control over Turkmenistan’s citizens private and public lives. To explore the impact of propaganda, Progres.online editors spoke with Ms. Yazliyeva, a media expert specializing in Turkmenistan, about its goals, mechanisms, and societal influence.
Oguljamal Yazliyeva is a Ph.D. candidate in International Area Studies at Charles University in Prague, specializing in Central Asian studies, with a focus on Turkmenistan, mass media and education policy. Some of her publications include – Dynamics of the Media System in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan and Media and Personality Cult in Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Turkmenistan. Ms. Yazliyeva previously served as Director of the Turkmen Service at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Prague. She held teaching and administrative positions at the Turkmen State University in Ashgabat. Ms. Yazliyeva completed a graduate program at Penn State University as a Hubert Humphrey Fellow.
What does “propaganda” mean in the context of Turkmenistan?
To understand propaganda in Turkmenistan, we must first consider the country’s autocratic evolution. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkmenistan declared itself a secular democracy. However, in reality it has consistently moved away from democratic principles. In his address to the Halk Maslahaty – the People’s Council – Saparmurat Niyazov, the first president, expressed his intention to gradually build a democratic state and to “establish control over the mass media”. (Turkmenbashy 1992). Niyazov understood the power of mass media in shaping public opinion and promoting ideological control. He used the media to promote his personal ideology, ensuring loyalty and sustaining autocratic rule.
Turkmenistan’s governance model recycles authoritarian controls inherited from the Soviet Union, while drawing on local traditions and history, including the era of serdars (military commanders) and khans (tribal leaders). This historical-political blend makes propaganda a key tool for reinforcing state authority and the leader’s control over citizens. In Turkmenistan, propaganda is more than information dissemination; it is a mechanism to build a cult of personality around the leader, portraying his role as vital to the nation’s identity and well-being.
What is the main goal of Turkmen propaganda and how successful is it? Do you have any ideas on how the government evaluates its effectiveness?
Turkmen propaganda seeks to shape public perception, consolidate presidential power, and maintain strong, centralized control. Under Saparmurat Niyazov, the government promoted a “Turkmen model” of state-building, marking the “Golden Age of Turkmens”. His successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, advanced this vision through eras like the “Great Renaissance” (2006 – 2012), the “Era of Might and Happiness” (2012 – 2022), and the current “Revival of a New Era of a Powerful State”. The regime’s success is reflected in the population’s loyalty and the fear instilled through repression. Domestically, the government views propaganda as effective, citing achievements like its neutrality-focused foreign policy.
The media plays a crucial role in this propaganda, spreading state-approved messages and reinforcing the authoritarian, personalistic regime. Turkmen social media influencers and platforms like Turkmenportal and Orient also extend propaganda’s reach, particularly targeting youth to promote state-approved narratives. Propaganda’s effectiveness is evident in fostering self-censorship, stifling dissent, and creating a culture where praising the leader is a social norm.
How would you characterize the language used by the government and state media in Turkmenistan? Do you know how the government makes up this language? What are the most used and abused expressions that a citizen hears every day?
In Turkmenistan, state media primarily serves to legitimize the authority of the political elite, with propaganda of Serdarçylyk (one-man rule) at its core. Government agencies tightly control media content, style, and the promotion of the leader’s cult of personality. The Türkmen Döwlet Habarlar Gullugy (Turkmen State News Agency), the central media outlet of the government, and national TV channels focus heavily on glorifying the state leader. Even cultural, sports, or health-related coverage is centered around highlighting the president’s “remarkable” leadership.
For example, a six-minute sports report on Watan (Homeland) program on bicycle riding in the Serdar district of Balkan province mentioned the president’s “achievements, inspirations, and initiatives” eight times. The reporter frequently used epithets like mähriban we gahryman Arkadag (“dear and hero Protector”). Broadcasts often include mandatory references to slogans like Berkarar döwletimiziň bagtyýarlyk döwri (“Prosperous Era of a Powerful State”), Hormatly Arkadagymyz (“Our Dear Protector”), and Gahryman Arkadagly Serdarymyz (“Our Hero Serdar with Father Protector”). Nearly every news story is framed around the leader’s name and title, and omissions of such references can result in serious consequences for journalists.
This staged and repetitive use of propaganda language reinforces the leader’s dominance in public consciousness while leaving audiences exposed to constant glorification of the regime.
Is it generally true that you can change the perception of what is happening with the help of words? Can you give examples from Turkmen life?
Yes, words can significantly shape perceptions of reality. The Turkmen government uses carefully crafted language to influence public and international narratives. Domestically, propaganda often uses glorifying epithets like “Hormatly gahryman prezidentimiz” (“Our Dear Hero President”) to reinforce the leader’s cult of personality. These expressions are deliberately preserved in Turkmen-language content but are often softened or omitted when translated into Russian or English for foreign audiences.
This manipulation of language affects public behavior. For example, self-censorship is widespread, and sycophancy has become ingrained in Turkmen society, particularly among policymakers and elites. Sycophancy refers to the behavior of individuals who show excessive loyalty or admiration toward a person in power, often to gain favor, privileges, or avoid punishment. Rituals like kissing the president’s hand or bowing to his books – frequently shown on state TV – demonstrate excessive loyalty. Such actions are meant to display unquestioning devotion and are a stark example of how language and symbolism reinforce the government’s control and ideology.
What is the interplay of propaganda and fear? Do people support the propaganda in Turkmenistan because they genuinely believe in it, or do they accept it due to fear and having no other choice?
Propaganda and fear are used as tools to maintain control over society. The fear generated by propaganda ensures obedience, stifles resistance, and fosters a culture of compliance and loyalty. In Turkmenistan, people primarily support propaganda out of fear, as they have been witnessing severe repression since the early years of independence. While we lack the ability to conduct surveys to determine the exact proportion of the population that truly believes in the propaganda versus those who accept it out of fear, my observations suggest that certain segments of society are deeply influenced by it.
A notable group is the generation educated during the Ruhnama era (2001 – 2011), the spiritual book authored by former President Saparmurat Niyazov. It was a mandatory subject in schools and universities, instilling loyalty and suppressing critical thinking. Members of this generation, now adults in professional roles (e.g. journalists or bloggers), often uphold and disseminate the regime’s values as they genuinely believe in the teachings of Ruhnama. A common expression heard in Turkmen society is “We live in peace. Our sky is clear,” reflecting the narrow worldview promoted by the state.
There are also individuals who are forced to accept the current system and simply adapt to it. These include citizens aware of the regime’s repressive nature, such as families of labor migrants who access alternative sources of information or individuals with relatives negatively affected by the state, such as imprisoned activists. Those who studied abroad or speak languages other than Turkmen often have access to broader perspectives, enabling them to see through state propaganda. Despite this, fear of punishment limits open dissent, leaving many to outwardly conform to state narratives to avoid repercussions.
How do Turkmens resist this language? Do you see any language of resistance and counter messages? Which spaces?
Despite the pervasive fear in Turkmen society, some individuals resist the propaganda, though their opposition is often subtle. Traditional spaces like teahouses, sadaka gatherings held for family events, or mosques occasionally serve as venues for cautious discussions, though open criticism of the regime is rare. Resistance is typically confined to trusted circles and people tend to be cautious and avoid openly challenging the regime. Rare instances of resistance also occur, such as when groups of rural residents visit local authorities to voice complaints about shortages of subsidized goods needed to feed their families.
The spread of the internet and social media, although limited, has provided some opportunities for people to resist state propaganda. Most open discussions of anti-government sentiment take place on platforms outside Turkmenistan, where civic Turkmen activists voice criticism that has little impact inside the country. Critical content is rarely posted within Turkmenistan due to strict government censorship and the criminalization of defamation, which deters individuals from openly criticizing the regime.
Similarly, alternative forms of communication emerge: satirical memes or coded jokes offer a way for people to express frustration. One widely shared IMO message reads: “They asked about the complaint of the camel. The camel said: “I do not complain about the burden I carry, but it is very painful for the caravan to be led by a donkey”. This metaphor subtly critiques leadership without directly naming officials, making it a safe yet powerful form of dissent.
