A November 2024 report by the Washington D.C.-based Center for the National Interest, titled “Afghanistan’s Qoshtepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia” examines the history and current state of the Qoshtepa Canal, and its geopolitical, technical, environmental, and legal aspects.
The Qoshtepa Canal, being built on the Amu Darya River in Afghanistan, could significantly reduce water availability in Central Asia, a region already facing severe water scarcity. Sustainable design and construction are crucial to prevent Soviet mistakes during the construction of canals on the same river.
The Qoshtepa Canal is expected to irrigate up to 1.2 million acres of land, with an estimated 6-13 billion m3 of water extracted every year. Some reports suggest that 8-17% of water might be diverted from the river compared to the earlier reports of 20%.
While the project is expected to reduce poverty and increase food supply in Afghanistan, it poses serious issues downstream in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which rely on the river for agriculture and drinking water. These countries are already experiencing severe climate change effects and the region is becoming increasingly hot and dry.
Amu Darya River and Qoshtepa Canal project
Amu Darya river originates in the Pamir Highlands, spanning Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The river basin extends to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and it flowed into Aral Sea before it disappeared.
The canal project is located in three northern Afghan provinces near the Uzbek and Turkmen borders. The canal is designed to be 100 m wide and 287 km long with a depth of 8.5 m. It aims to irrigate over 1.2 million acres of farmland in Afghanistan and create thousands of agricultural jobs. Construction began in 2021, involving 5 thousand workers and 4 thousand machines. As of November 2024, around 115 km of the canal was constructed.
The project is estimated to take 6 years, but is likely to take longer to complete all steps, including sub-canals to distribute water to the fields. It may take 10 more years before Afghanistan starts to fully use the capacity to extract water from the river.
Figure 1
Existing and planned canals on Amu Darya River.
Source: Center for the National Interest.
Initially planned in the 1970s, the Qoshtepa Canal project was abandoned after the government collapse following the Soviet-Afghan War. Historically, Afghanistan extracted minimal water from the river, while Soviet Central Asian republics utilized the river heavily for cotton production, which still accounts for 92% of the extracted water from Amu Darya today. Soviet-era canals, such as the Karakum Canal, diverted water from the river to irrigate arid land in the Karakum Valley, contributing to the Aral Sea disaster. The initial Soviet plans also included the construction of the Main Turkmen Canal which was not realized.
Environmental impacts of the canal
Soviet-built older canals were unlined to cut costs, leading to severe soil salinization as rising groundwater levels pushed salts to the surface. Additionally, there were no drainage canals to transport waste water high in salt content from irrigated fields, further exacerbating soil salinization. From 1990 to 2018 salinization in Central Asia increased by 7%.
Similarly, the Qoshtepa Canal lacks lining, raising concerns about water seepage, soil salinization and alkalinization. International experts warn that the outdated construction methods and cost-cutting measures may lead to significant water losses through soil seepage and environmental harm.
Water allocation from the Amu Darya River
The current water allocation framework for the Amu Darya river dates back to the 1987 USSR agreement, which set an annual extraction limit for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan was allocated 35.8% of the total water limit (22 billion m3/year), while Afghanistan was assumed to withdraw 2.1 billion m3/year but was not part of the agreement. Today, Afghanistan withdraws around 2.5 billion m3/year.
After the USSR’s collapse, Central Asian countries reaffirmed the 1987 agreement by signing the Almaty agreement and the Nukus Declaration. The four countries also continue to agree on allocations today. These agreements excluded Afghanistan, meaning that the country is not bound and it does not have to follow the water use restrictions.
Given the importance of the river for the whole region, a new Amu Darya Basin agreement with the involvement of Afghanistan is essential. Potential diversion of up to 20% of water by Afghanistan, combined with the climate change effects, may worsen water scarcity in Central Asia and destabilize Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan relationships.
The report recommends steps such as involving the U.S. government to ensure water-efficient canal construction, strengthening regional diplomacy, and providing investments and technical assistance to improve the irrigation systems in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
